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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
 Jason Ward appeals from the district court’s order summarily dismissing 
his successive petition for post-conviction relief. 
 
Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings 
 
 In May 2011, Ward forcibly raped an acquaintance, M.M., in a secluded 
location near a canal in Twin Falls County.  (#40467 R., pp.12-15; #40467 Tr., 
p.100, L.13 – p.149, L.14.1)   M.M. called 911, was transported to a hospital, and 
underwent a sexual assault exam.  (#40467 R., pp.12-15; #40467 Tr., p.150, 
Ls.5-20; p.307, L.13 – p.345, L.5.)  The state charged Ward with rape and the 
persistent violator sentencing enhancement.  (#40467 R., pp.92-95.) 
 Pursuant to an agreement with the state, Ward pled guilty to rape and the 
state agreed to dismiss the sentencing enhancement.  (#40467 R., pp.152-161; 
#40467 Tr., p.6, L.15 – p.23, L.15.)  However, approximately three months later, 
and after Ward retained new counsel (#40467 R., pp.176-177), the district court 
granted Ward’s motion to withdraw his guilty plea on the ground that the plea was 
based upon erroneous legal advice given by Ward’s previous counsel.  (#40467 
                                            
1 On March 18, 2016, the Idaho Supreme Court entered an order augmenting the 
appellate record with the clerk’s record, transcripts, and exhibits associated with 
Ward’s direct appeal from his underlying conviction, Docket No. 40467.  (3/18/16 
Order.)  On June 28, 2016, the Idaho Supreme Court granted Ward’s motion to 
take judicial notice of its own files and records from the same case.  (6/28/16 
Order.)  In the post-conviction proceeding, the district court took judicial notice of 
the “underlying trial and appellate records.”  (R., p.375 n.3.)  In its Respondent’s 
brief in this case, the state refers to the transcript that contains the change of 
plea hearing, hearing on motion to withdraw guilty plea, pretrial conference, jury 
trial, and sentencing hearing as “#40467 Tr.” 
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R., pp.185-200, 236-237; #40467 Tr., p.73, L.25 – p.76, L.7.)  The case 
proceeded to trial, where the jury found Ward guilty of rape.  (#40467 R., p.315.)  
Ward then pled guilty to the persistent violator sentencing enhancement.  (See 
#40467 R., p.338.)  The district court imposed a unified 20-year sentence with 
seven years fixed to run consecutive to two other sentences Ward was serving at 
the time.  (#40467 R., pp.349-353; #40467 Tr., p.517, L.11 – p.535, L.1.)  The 
Idaho Court of Appeals affirmed Ward’s judgment of conviction.  State v. Ward, 
2014 WL 3555769 (Idaho App. July 17, 2014) (unpublished). 
 In July 2015, Ward filed a post-conviction petition.  (R., pp.6-13.)  The 
district court appointed counsel to represent Ward in the proceeding.  (R., pp.18-
19.)  In an amended petition, Ward, through counsel, raised five ineffective 
assistance of trial counsel claims.  (R., pp.304-309.)  Among them, relevant to 
this appeal, Ward asserted that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to “fully 
investigate” or utilize potential defense witness Lane Buddenhagen.  (R., p.306.)  
The district court granted the state’s motion to summarily dismiss the amended 
petition.  (R., pp.373-385.)  With respect to Ward’s claim relating to Lane 
Buddenhagen, the district court concluded that Ward failed to provide evidence 
indicating what, specifically, Buddenhagen would have testified about, how such 
testimony would have been admissible at trial, how trial counsel’s decision not to 
utilized Buddenhagen constituted deficient performance, and how such testimony 
would have impacted the outcome of the trial.  (R., p.381.)  Therefore, the court 
concluded, the claim was “bare and conclusory,” and subject to dismissal on that 
basis.  (Id.)    
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 Ward timely appealed.  (R., pp.386-390.)  The district court appointed 
counsel to represent Ward on the appeal.  (R., pp.391-393.)  However, the Idaho 
Supreme Court granted appointed counsel’s motion to withdraw from the case 
after counsel determined that he could not file an opening brief that complied with 
I.A.R. 11.2(a).  (6/28/16 Motion and Affidavit; 7/19/16 Order.)  Ward proceeds pro 
se. 
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ISSUES 
 
 Ward states the issues on appeal as: 
1. Did the district court [err] in dismissing the petition for post[-
]conviction relief, specifically the claim of newly discovered 
evidence? 
 
2. Did the court [err] in ignoring petitioner[’]s motion for conflict 
counsel? 
 
3. Does the cumulative error doctrine apply?  
 
(Appellant’s brief, p.5.) 
 
 The state rephrases the issues on appeal as: 
 
1. Has Ward failed to show that the district court erred by summarily 
dismissing his post-conviction claim that his trial counsel was ineffective 
for failing to adequately investigate Lane Buddenhagen and/or call him as 
a witness at the jury trial? 
 
2. Did Ward fail to preserve his conflict claim regarding his appointed post-
conviction counsel?    
 
3. Has Ward failed to demonstrate that the cumulative error doctrine 
 applies to this case? 
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ARGUMENT 
 
I. 
Ward Has Failed To Show That The District Court Erred By Summarily 
Dismissing His Post-Conviction Claim That His Trial Counsel Was Ineffective For 
Failing To Adequately Investigate Lane Buddenhagen And/Or Call Him As A 
Witness At The Jury Trial 
 
A. Introduction 
Ward contends that the district court erred in summarily dismissing his 
post-conviction petition.  (Appellant’s brief, pp.6-7.2)  Specifically, Ward contends 
that the district court erred by summarily dismissing his claim that his trial 
counsel was ineffective for failing to adequately investigate Lane Buddenhagen  
and/or call him as a witness at the jury trial.  (Id.)  Ward has failed to show that 
the district court erred.  As the district court correctly concluded, Ward failed to 
present any evidence regarding what Budenhagen would have testified about, 
weather such testimony would have been admissible, and how such testimony 
would have supported his defense. 
 
B. Standard Of Review 
 
“On review of a dismissal of a post-conviction relief application without an 
evidentiary hearing, this Court will determine whether a genuine issue of material 
fact exists based on the pleadings, depositions and admissions together with any 
affidavits on file.”  Workman v. State, 144 Idaho 518, 523, 164 P.3d 798, 803 
(2007). 
                                            
2 Some of the pages in Ward’s Appellant’s brief are not numbered consistently 
with other pages.  (See generally Appellant’s brief.)  Therefore, in this brief, page 
citations to the Appellant’s brief are numbered sequentially from the first page.  
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C. The District Court Correctly Concluded That Ward Was Not Entitled To 
Post-Conviction Relief  
 
Post-conviction proceedings are governed by the Uniform Post-Conviction 
Procedure Act.  I.C. § 19-4901, et seq.  A petition for post-conviction relief 
initiates a new and independent civil proceeding in which the petitioner bears the 
burden of establishing that he is entitled to relief.  Workman, 144 Idaho at 522, 
164 P.3d at 802; State v. Bearshield, 104 Idaho 676, 678, 662 P.2d 548, 550 
(1983).    
 Idaho Code § 19-4906 authorizes summary dismissal of an application for 
post-conviction relief, in response to a party’s motion or on the court’s own 
initiative, if the applicant “has not presented evidence making a prima facie case 
as to each essential element of the claims upon which the applicant bears the 
burden of proof.”  Berg v. State, 131 Idaho 517, 518, 960 P.2d 738, 739 (1998).  
Until controverted by the state, allegations in a verified post-conviction 
application are, for purposes of determining whether to hold an evidentiary 
hearing, deemed true.  Cooper v. State, 96 Idaho 542, 545, 531 P.2d 1187, 1190 
(1975).  However, the court is not required to accept either the applicant’s mere 
conclusory allegations, unsupported by admissible evidence, or the applicant’s 
conclusions of law.  Ferrier v. State, 135 Idaho 797, 799, 25 P.3d 110, 112 (2001); 
Roman v. State, 125 Idaho 644, 647, 873 P.2d 898, 901 (Ct. App. 1994).  
 A post-conviction petitioner alleging ineffective assistance of counsel must 
demonstrate both deficient performance and resulting prejudice.  Strickland v. 
Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-88 (1984); State v. Charboneau, 116 Idaho 129, 
137, 774 P.2d 299, 307 (1989).  Bare assertions and speculation, unsupported by 
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specific facts, do not make out a prima facie case for ineffective assistance of 
counsel.  Roman, 125 Idaho at 649, 873 P.2d at 903. 
With respect to the deficiency prong of Strickland, “[w]hen evaluating an 
ineffective assistance of counsel claim, this Court does not second-guess 
strategic and tactical decisions, and such decisions cannot serve as a basis for 
post-conviction relief unless the decision is shown to have resulted from 
inadequate preparation, ignorance of the relevant law or other shortcomings 
capable of objective review.”  State v. Payne, 146 Idaho 548, 561, 199 P.3d 123, 
136 (2008).  The decision to call a witness falls within the category of trial 
counsel's strategic or tactical decisions and will generally not be second-
guessed.  Rodgers v. State, 129 Idaho 720, 724, 932 P.2d 348, 352 (1997).  
Thus, to prevail on a claim that trial counsel was ineffective in failing to call a 
specific witness, a petitioner is required to present facts, supported by admissible 
evidence, to “overcome the presumption that, under the circumstances, the 
challenged action ‘might be considered sound trial strategy.’" Strickland, 466 U.S. 
at 689 (citation omitted). 
To establish Strickland prejudice, a defendant must show a reasonable 
probability that, but for counsel’s deficient performance, the outcome of the 
proceeding would have been different.  Aragon v. State, 114 Idaho 758, 761, 760 
P.2d 1174, 1177 (1988); Cowger v. State, 132 Idaho 681, 685, 978 P.2d 241, 245 
(Ct. App. 1999).   
In this case, the district court summarily dismissed Ward’s claim that his 
trial counsel was ineffective for failing to adequately investigate Lane 
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Buddenhagen and/or call him as a witness at the jury trial.3  (R., p.381.)  After 
citing the applicable law, the court concluded: 
Nothing in Ward’s petitions or supporting affidavits provides 
anything in the way of evidence as to what Mr. Buddenhagen’s 
testimony would have been (beyond the cursory statement that he 
would have testified “about prior sexual conduct of the victim”), how 
it would have been relevant, how it would have satisfied I.R.E. 
412(b), how the decision not to call him as a witness was due to a 
deficiency on counsel’s part, and how the addition of such 
testimony would have affected the outcome of Ward’s trial.  As 
such, this claim is bare and conclusory and will be summarily 
dismissed. 
 
(Id.)   
 
A review of the record supports the conclusions of the district court.  In his 
amended petition, with respect to this ineffective assistance of counsel claim, 
Ward asserted only that his counsel was ineffective for failing to adequately 
investigate Buddenhagen, and for failing to provide proper notice for 
Buddenhagen’s potential testimony pursuant to I.R.E. 412(b).4  (R., p.306.)  In a 
pro se affidavit submitted by Ward prior to the appointment of counsel, Ward 
                                            
3 On appeal, Ward describes this as a “new evidence” claim and cites law 
applicable to a defendant’s motion for a new trial.  (Appellant’s brief, pp.6-7.)  
The “new evidence” discussed by Ward is the potential trial testimony of Lane 
Buddenhagen.  (Id.)   Ward did not file a motion for a new trial in district court, 
and did not attempt to raise a “new evidence” claim in his amended post-
conviction petition.  (See R., p.304-309.)  Therefore, the state liberally construes 
this claim on appeal as asserting that the district court erred by summarily 
dismissing Ward’s post-conviction claim that his trial counsel was ineffective for 
failing to adequately investigate Lane Buddenhagen and/or call him as a witness 
at the jury trial. 
 
4 Idaho Rule of Evidence 412(b) governs the admissibility, in a criminal case 
where the defendant is accused of a sex crime, of the victim’s past sexual 
activity.   
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asserted that “there were other guys that had been accused of the same thing by 
the same person,” and that Buddenhagen was one of these people.  (R., p.11.)  
In an affidavit submitted in support of Ward’s post-conviction petition after 
counsel was appointed, Ward asserted that “[t]he prospective testimony of Lane 
Buddenhagen was discussed on page 85 [of the transcript of the trial and pre-
trial hearings], lines 18-23, and pages 92 through 94, lines 19 through 15.”  (R., 
p.303.)  These portions of the transcript, however, do not support Ward’s 
ineffective assistance of trial counsel claim.  On page 85, Ward’s trial counsel 
simply informed the court that he planned on calling up to five witnesses, 
including Ward, but did not specifically reference Buddenhagen.  (#40467 Tr., 
p.85, Ls.18-23.)  On pages 92 through 94, the parties and the court discussed 
the state’s motion in limine to prevent Buddenhagen from testifying at the trial.  
(#40467 Tr., p.92, L.19 – p.94, L.15.)  The district court declined to rule on the 
motion because it did not know the nature of Buddenhagen’s potential testimony.  
(#40467 Tr., p.93, L.4 – p.94, L.16.)  The court also noted that Buddenhagen was 
the defendant in a pending murder trial.5  (#40467 Tr., p.93, Ls.6-11.)  Ward’s trial 
counsel informed the court that he was “exploring” the possibility of utilizing 
Buddenhagen as a witness, and that if he ultimately chose to do so, he would 
provide the proper notice of such testimony to the extent required by I.R.E. 
412(b).  (#40467 Tr., p.93, L.19 – p.94, L.6.)   
                                            
5 In 2012, Buddenhagen pled guilty to voluntary manslaughter and received a 15-
year unified sentence with 5 years fixed.  See ICourt Portal, State v. 
Buddenhagen, Twin Falls County District Court Case No. CR-2011-09146.  
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At the hearing on the state's motion for summary dismissal, Ward’s post-
conviction counsel did not submit any additional argument to the court in support 
of this claim, other than asserting, in a conclusory manner, that “we believe [trial 
counsel] failed to sufficiently investigate this witness.”  (Tr., p.18, L.24 – p.19, 
L.3.) 
As the district court correctly concluded, Ward did not allege specifically 
what Buddenhagen would have testified about, how this testimony would have 
been beneficial to his defense, which provision of I.R.E. 412(b) would govern the 
admissibility of the testimony, how such testimony would have been admissible 
under this rule, how trial counsel’s investigation of Ward was deficient, or how it 
was some objective shortcoming (rather than a strategic decision), that resulted 
in Ward’s trial counsel ultimately deciding not to utilize Buddenhagen as a 
witness at the jury trial.  Therefore, this claim is conclusory and unsupported by 
facts which, if true, demonstrate that Ward was entitled to relief under a 
Strickland analysis.  Ward has therefore failed to demonstrate that the district 
court erred in summarily dismissing this ineffective assistance of trial counsel 
claim. 
 
II. 
Ward Failed To Preserve His Conflict Claim Regarding His Appointed Post-
Conviction Counsel 
 
A. Introduction 
Ward contends that the district court erred by failing to rule on his “Motion 
For Appointment Of Conflict-Free Counsel” prior to summarily dismissing his 
post-conviction petition.  (Appellant’s brief, p.8.)  Ward also contends, for the first 
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time on appeal, that his appointed counsel, a Twin Falls County public defender, 
had an actual conflict of interest because, he asserts, the Twin Falls County 
Public Defender’s Office represented one of the state’s witnesses at Ward’s 
underlying jury trial.  (Appellant’s brief, pp.4, 8.)  Ward failed to raise this actual 
counsel conflict allegation to the district court below.  Therefore, this claim is 
waived and cannot be considered on appeal. 
 
B. Ward Failed To Preserve His Conflict Claim 
 
It is well-settled that Idaho’s appellate courts “will not consider issues not 
raised in the court below.”  State v. Mosqueda, 150 Idaho 830, 833, 252 P.3d 
563, 566 (Ct. App. 2011) (citing State v. Wheaton, 121 Idaho 404, 407, 825 P.2d 
501, 504 (1992)).   
In October 2015, after counsel was appointed to represent him in the post-
conviction proceeding, and after appointed counsel field an amended post-
conviction petition, Ward filed a pro se “Motion For Appointment Of Conflict-Free 
Counsel” and supporting affidavit.  (R., pp.310-321.)  There is no indication in the 
appellate record that the district court ruled on this motion.  In his Appellant’s 
brief, Ward asserts that the Twin Falls County public defender who was 
appointed to represent him in his post-conviction proceeding6 had an actual 
conflict of interest because the Twin Falls County Public Defender’s Office 
previously represented “one of the state’s center[]piece witnesses” at the jury 
                                            
6 While Marilyn Paul, a Twin Falls County public defender, was appointed to 
represent Ward in the post-conviction proceeding (R., pp.18-19), Ward retained 
David Smethers, private counsel, for his jury trial (See generally #40467 Tr., 
pp.98-494). 
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trial.  (Appellant’s brief, pp.4, 8.)   However, Ward did not make this assertion in 
his “Motion For Appointment Of Conflict-Free Counsel” filed in district court.  (See 
R., pp.310-321.)  Instead, in that motion, Ward described a personal conflict 
between himself and his appointed counsel, and made various complaints 
relating to counsel’s representation.  (See id.); see also State v. Wood, 132 Idaho 
88, 98, 967 P.2d 702, 712 (1998) (“A conflict of interest is active representation of 
competing interests not mere disagreements between a petitioner and counsel.”).  
Because Ward did not allege an actual conflict to the district court, his 
corresponding claim on appeal is waived.   
Further, even if Ward had preserved his conflict claim, and even assuming 
the district court erred in failing to rule on Ward’s motion, any such error is 
harmless.  “The court at every stage of the proceeding must disregard any error 
or defect in the proceeding which does not affect the substantial rights of the 
parties.”  I.R.C.P. 61.  In this case, any error related to the district court's failure to 
rule on Ward's motion for conflict-free counsel was harmless because, as the 
Idaho Court of Appeals recently clarified, a post-conviction petitioner is not 
entitled to conflict-free counsel when challenging a non-capital conviction.  Green 
v. State, 160 Idaho 658, ___, 377 P.3d 1120, 1121 (Ct. App. 2016) (“A petitioner 
is not entitled to conflict-free or effective counsel when the trial court has 
discretion to appoint counsel, as in noncapital post-conviction proceedings.”). 
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C. In the Alternative, Even If This Court Construes Ward’s Appellant’s Brief As 
Challenging The District Court’s Failure To Address The Issues He Actually 
Raised Below, Ward Has Still Failed To Demonstrate He Is Entitled To 
Relief 
 
 In his Appellant’s brief, Ward does not expressly reference any of the 
allegations he actually made in his “Motion For Appointment Of Conflict-Free 
Counsel” filed in the district court.  (See Appellant’s brief, pp.4, 8.)  In that motion 
and supporting affidavit, Ward requested “conflict-free” counsel on the grounds 
that his appointed counsel: (1) did not adequately communicate with him; (2) 
inappropriately filed “ex parte” motions for transport with the district court; (3) 
failed to obtain case files from his previous retained attorneys; and (4) failed to 
provide him with complete copies of the state’s filings in the post-conviction case.  
(R., pp.310-321.)  To the extent this Court construes Ward’s Appellant’s brief as 
challenging the district court’s failure to rule on these allegations, rather than the 
actual conflict claim he raises on appeal, Ward has still failed to show he is 
entitled to relief for several reasons. 
First, Ward has not presented any argument or authority standing for the 
proposition that a district court is required to rule on a pro se motion for substitute 
counsel filed by a represented post-conviction petitioner.  Nor has he attempted 
to explain why the grounds he set forth to the district court entitled him to 
substitute counsel.  Therefore, this claim is waived for appeal.  “A party waives an 
issue on appeal if either authority or argument are lacking.”  State v. Freitas, 157 
Idaho 257, 267, 335 P.3d 597, 607 (Ct. App. 2014) (citing State v. Zichko, 129 
Idaho 259, 263, 923 P.2d 966, 970 (1996)).  
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Ward has additionally failed to demonstrate he is entitled to relief because 
the district court’s order granting the state’s motion for summary dismissal 
constituted an implicit denial of Ward’s motion for substitute counsel.  The Idaho 
Supreme Court has held that “where a district court fails to rule on a motion, we 
presume the district court denied the motion.”  State v. Wolfe, 158 Idaho 55, 61-
62, 343 P.3d 497, 503-504 (2015) (citing Sales v. Peabody, 157 Idaho 195, 202, 
335 P.3d 40, 47 (2014); United States v. Claxton, 766 F.3d 280, 291 (3rd Cir. 
2014) (noting that several federal circuit courts of appeals treat a district court's 
failure to rule on an outstanding motion as an implicit denial of that motion); 
United States v. Jasso, 634 F.3d 305, 307 n. 2 (5th Cir. 2011) (treating a district 
court's failure to rule on a motion for reconsideration as an implicit denial based 
on the entry of a final judgment); Norman v. Apache Corp., 19 F.3d 1017, 1021 
(5th Cir. 1994) (“The denial of a motion by the district court, although not formally 
expressed, may be implied by the entry of a final judgment or of an order 
inconsistent with the granting of the relief sought by the motion.”)).  Therefore, 
although it does not appear from the appellate record that the district court 
explicitly ruled on Ward’s motion, this Court may presume that the district court 
denied that motion.  
Ward has failed to demonstrate he is entitled to relief on his claim that the 
district court erred by failing to rule on his “Motion For Appointment Of Conflict-
Free Counsel,” and on the clams within that motion pertaining to alleged 
deficiencies in the performance of his appointed post-conviction counsel.  This 
15 
 
Court should therefore affirm the district court’s order summarily dismissing 
Ward’s post-conviction petition. 
 
III. 
Ward Has Failed To Demonstrate That The Cumulative Error Doctrine Applies To 
This Case 
 
 Ward asserts that even if the errors he alleges were individually harmless, 
his constitutional due process rights were violated by the accumulation of errors.  
(Appellant’s brief, p.9.)  “Under the doctrine of cumulative error, a series of errors, 
harmless in and of themselves, may in the aggregate show the absence of a fair 
trial.  However, a necessary predicate to the application of the doctrine is a 
finding of more than one error.”  State v. Parker, 157 Idaho 132, 149, 334 P.3d 
806, 823 (2014) (quoting State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 230, 245 P.3d 961, 982 
(2010)).  
 Ward has failed to demonstrate that the cumulative error doctrine is 
applicable to this case and the claims he raises on appeal.  While some courts 
have applied the cumulative error doctrine to Strickland ineffective assistance of 
counsel claims, see e.g., State v. Woodel, 145 So.3d 782, 801-803 (Fla. 2014); 
but see State v. Hardin, 60 S.W.3d 397 (Ark. 2001) (holding that it was error for 
the trial court to entertain a claim of cumulative error in a Strickland analysis), 
Ward has only appealed the district court’s dismissal of one of the ineffective 
assistance of counsel claims raised in his amended post-conviction petition.  
(See generally Appellant’s brief.)  Thus, there is no asserted Strickland prejudice 
to cumulate.  The only other claim Ward raised on appeal - that his post-
conviction counsel had an actual conflict of interest - does not allege trial error, 
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and thus, cannot be cumulated with Ward’s ineffective assistance of counsel 
claim.  Because Ward has not alleged multiple errors that could theoretically 
cumulate in a manner to create an unfair trial, he has failed to show that the 
cumulative error doctrine applies in this case.   
In any event, as discussed above, Ward has failed to demonstrate any 
error, let alone “more than one error” required for application of the cumulative 
error doctrine.  Therefore, Ward has failed to demonstrate that he is entitled to 
relief pursuant to the cumulative error doctrine, or that the district court erred by 
declining to apply the cumulative error doctrine in the post-conviction proceeding.  
 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
 The state respectfully requests that this Court affirm the district court’s 
order summarily dismissing Ward’s petition for post-conviction relief. 
 DATED this 23rd day of January, 2017. 
 
 
       _/s/ Mark W. Olson_____ 
 MARK W. OLSON 
 Deputy Attorney General
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